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FAIR HOUSING ACT
Are Disparate Impact Claims Cognizable Under the Fair Housing Act?
CASE AT A GLANCE
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) makes it illegal to refuse to sell or rent or to “otherwise make unlawful or
deny” housing to a person because of a protected characteristic, including race. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
This case asks the Court to determine whether the FHA covers disparate impact claims, where a plaintiff
alleges discrimination based on the disparate impact that a defendant’s facially neutral practice has on
members of a group who share a protected characteristic.

Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project
Docket No. 13-1371
Argument Date: January 21, 2015
From: The Fifth Circuit
by Rigel C. Oliveri
University of Missouri School of Law, Columbia, MO

INTRODUCTION
Under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), it is illegal to refuse to sell or
rent or to “otherwise make unlawful or deny” housing to a person
because of a protected characteristic, including race. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(a). The FHA also prohibits discrimination in residential real
estate transactions, which includes providing financial assistance
for the purchase or construction of a dwelling, because of race. See
42 U.S.C. § 3605.
Disparate impact theory allows a plaintiff to allege discrimination
based on the disparate impact that a defendant’s facially neutral
practice has on members of a group who share a protected
characteristic. Liability can be avoided under this theory if the
challenged practice is determined to have a manifest relationship to
legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy objectives and is necessary to
attain those objectives, and if there is no other practice which can
achieve the same results without causing the disparate impact. The
Supreme Court first recognized disparate impact theory in Griggs
v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), an employment discrimination
case in which a unanimous Court held that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”
Subsequent district courts and courts of appeal have allowed claims
to be brought under this theory in FHA cases, although these courts
vary somewhat in the framework they use to analyze those claims.
The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the FHA.
In February 2013, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), which is authorized to issue regulations
implementing the FHA, promulgated a final rule stating “[l]iability
may be established under the [FHA] based on a practice’s
discriminatory effect … even if the practice was not motivated by a
discriminatory intent.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500.
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The Court has granted certiorari on the issue of disparate impact
theory and the Fair Housing Act twice in recent years, in 2011 for
Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548, and in 2013 for Township of Mt.
Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824.
Both cases settled and were dismissed before oral argument.

ISSUE
Are disparate impact claims cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?

FACTS
Federal law offers a tax subsidy in the form of Low Income Housing
Tax Credits (LIHTC) to developers who build qualified low-income
housing. LIHTCs are distributed by designated state agencies. This
case arose out of a challenge to the LIHTC allocations made by one
such agency, the Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs (the Department), in the Dallas metropolitan area.
The plaintiff, Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., is a nonprofit
organization whose mission is to further racial and socioeconomic
integration in the Dallas metropolitan area. In 2004, it was
appointed to be the fund administrator and housing mobility
provider in order to implement the remedy in a Dallas public
housing desegregation case, Walker v. HUD, 734 F. Supp. 1289
(N.D.Tex. 1989). In particular, Inclusive Communities assists lowincome predominantly black families who are eligible for the Dallas
Housing Authority’s Housing Choice Voucher Program (commonly
referred to as “Section 8” vouchers) in finding affordable housing
in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods. A development
that receives a LIHTC cannot refuse to accept tenants because of
their use of Section 8 Vouchers. As a result, a LIHTC development’s
location within the Dallas metropolitan area is important to
Inclusive Communities.
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Competition for LIHTCs is fierce, and in Texas the program has
historically been oversubscribed by a ratio of 2:1. The Department
awards LIHTCs according to a complex formula governed by both
state and federal statutes. For the most desirable LIHTC, the 9
percent credit, federal law requires that designated agencies adopt
a Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) that includes particular selection
criteria and preferences. Texas state law requires the Department
to first determine whether an application satisfies the threshold
criteria in the QAP. Then it must use a point system in order to
score and rank qualifying applications, specifically by prioritizing
eleven statutory criteria (referred to as “above-the-line” criteria) in
descending order. The Department may use additional “below-theline” criteria to supplement its decision making, but none of these
criteria may outweigh any “above-the-line” factors.
Inclusive Communities brought a disparate impact claim
against the Department in 2008, alleging that the Department
disproportionately approved LIHTCs in minority concentrated
neighborhoods and disproportionately disapproved them in
predominantly white neighborhoods. Inclusive Communities alleged
that from 1995 to 2009, the Department did not allocate any LIHTC
for units in predominantly white census tracts within Dallas. As a
result, by 2008 more than 92 percent of LIHTC units in Dallas were
located in minority census tracts. When looking at the metro area
as a whole, from 1999–2008 the Department approved tax credits for
49.7 percent of proposed units in areas that were at least 90 percent
minority, but only approved 37.4 percent of proposed units in areas
that were at least 90 percent white. Thus, according to Inclusive
Communities, the Department’s allocation practices caused lowincome housing to be concentrated in minority areas and less
available in white areas, which in turn maintains and perpetuates
segregated housing patterns.
The Department countered that any statistical disparity in LIHTC
allocation arose directly from federal and state laws that required
the Department to use fixed criteria, some of which are correlated
with race, in its decision making. Specifically, federal law requires
the state’s QAP to give preference to projects built in low-income
areas, and these areas contain a disproportionately high number
of minority residents. The district court assumed that the
Department’s interest in complying with the law was legitimate and
bona fide, but concluded that the Department failed to prove the
absence of any alternative that would reduce the statistical disparity
in allocation rates. Specifically, the court suggested that the
Department could add “below-the-line” criteria or otherwise adjust
its scoring formula to achieve greater parity in LIHTC allocation.
After the trial, while the district court was considering an injunctive
remedy, it granted permission to Frazier Revitalization, Inc. (FRI),
to intervene to represent the interests of developers and other
organizations seeking to revitalize low-income neighborhoods. FRI
is a nonprofit organization formed to implement a revitalization plan
for the Frazier Courts neighborhood in Southern Dallas. Frazier is a
predominantly black neighborhood that has experienced significant
decline. The Frazier Neighborhood Plan calls for more than $270
million in new development in order to create a mixed-income
neighborhood with affordable housing and a full range of basic
services. FRI depends upon LIHTC allocations to fund these efforts.
It argued that requiring the Department to increase its allocation of
tax credits to projects in more affluent white areas would reduce the
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amount of credits available to Frazier and other low-income minority
neighborhoods. Thus, FRI filed briefs in support of the Department.
The issue was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the finding of disparate impact liability.

CASE ANALYSIS
Textual Arguments
The bulk of the Department’s arguments focus on the text of the
FHA, which the Department contends does not allow for disparate
impact theory. The Department begins by arguing that the text of
the FHA prohibits only purposeful discrimination. The relevant
provisions of the FHA are 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), which makes it
unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent …, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race” and § 3605,
which forbids anyone involved in residential real estate transactions
“to discriminate against any person … because of race.” The
Department argues that this language suggests that any covered
action must be taken for a particular, conscious, and deliberate
reason. It does not support an additional prohibition on actions that
discriminate based on factors that just happen to be correlated with
race or other protected characteristics.
Inclusive Communities disagrees with this characterization of
the language in § 3604(a) and § 3605. In particular, Inclusive
Communities points to the phrase “otherwise make unavailable,”
arguing that nothing in this phrase requires an action with a
discriminatory intent. Rather, “make unavailable” describes an
action and the effect of an action, not the motivation of the actor.
Finally, Inclusive Communities points out that these parts of the
statute contain no references to the words “intent” or “intentional”
when describing prohibited conduct. There are other specific
portions of the FHA that do contain references to intent, but these
should be read as only applying to those discrete sections.
The Department argues that textual differences between Title VII
and the FHA justify treating the two statutes differently when it
comes to disparate impact analysis. Title VII contains two relevant
provisions: § 703(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for an employer
“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual … because of” protected
characteristics; and § 703(a)(2), which makes it unlawful for
an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees … in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive … any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee” because of a protected characteristic. The
Department contends that the second provision, with its reference
to the effects of an employer’s actions, is the only part of the statute
that encompasses disparate impact claims. The Department further
argues that Griggs, which recognized the disparate impact cause of
action in Title VII cases, should be read only as applying to § 703(a)
(2) and identical language in other statutes, and that any attempt to
extend it beyond this language is textually unsound.
As support, the Department points to Smith v. City of Jackson, 544
U.S. 228 (2005), in which the Court was called upon to interpret
two almost identical provisions in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA): Section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA prohibits
discrimination “because of” age, and § 4(a)(2) prohibits actions
which “adversely affect” employees because of age. In Smith, a
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plurality of the Court held that § 4(a)(2) supports disparate impact
theory because of its similarity to § 703(a)(2) in its reference to
discriminatory effects. The justices all appeared to reject the notion
that § (4)(a)(1) allowed for disparate impact claims.
The Department argues that §§ 3604(a) and 3605 of the FHA are
analogous only to § 703(a)(1) of Title VII and § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA.
These sections, the Department contends, focus on the defendant’s
motivation for the challenged conduct rather than the effect of the
conduct on the plaintiff. Significantly, they contain no mention
of “effects” or actions that “adversely affect” others. Without any
provision comparable to Title VII’s § 703(a)(2) or the ADEA’s § 4(a)
(2), with their references to adverse effects, there is nothing in the
FHA that provides for a disparate impact cause of action, concludes
the Department.
Inclusive Communities argues the Smith decision does not
undermine the use of disparate impact in housing because the
overwhelming weight of authority has upheld the application of
Griggs to the FHA. Most of the cases to do so did not rely strictly on
the textual similarities in the statutes, but on the “otherwise make
unavailable” language, as well as the FHA’s legislative history and
uniquely broad mandate (discussed in the next section).
Legislative History and Purpose
Inclusive Communities spends a good deal of time discussing
the context and structure of the FHA, in particular arguing that
the statute has always had two primary goals: (1) to eliminate
discrimination in housing, and (2) to combat the perpetuation
of segregation. Inclusive Communities describes how centuries
of widespread government-sponsored discrimination in housing
have led directly to the segregated patterns of today. It points to
multiple places within the legislative history of the FHA, from
the Congressional Record to the Attorney General’s 1968 brief for
Congress, in which supporters of the statute make clear that it was
meant to eliminate the effects of prior government discrimination.
In particular, there are many ways in which governmental actors can
pursue facially neutral policies that retrench segregated patterns,
and the FHA was intended to reach those, as well as more deliberate
acts of discrimination.
Inclusive Communities notes that the statute contains a unique
introductory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, which states that “It is
the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.” No
other civil rights statute has a provision with such a broad scope.
The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require a
broad and generous construction of the FHA as a remedial statute,
and has recognized that “the reach of the [FHA] was to replace the
ghettos by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.” Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1973). Inclusive
Communities contends that this is clear evidence that the FHA was
meant to reach actions, whether deliberate or not, that serve to
perpetuate segregation, and points to a number of courts of appeals
that have specifically so held.
The Department argues that the historical context and development
of the FHA cannot alter the meaning of the unambiguous statutory
text that Congress enacted in 1968. It also points out that the
statute was amended in 1988, well after the Supreme Court had first
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recognized disparate impact theory in Griggs, yet the amendments
did not include any reference to disparate impact or adverse effects.
Moreover, if the amendments had explicitly authorized disparate
impact theory, the amendments would have never been signed by
then president Reagan.
Agency Arguments
Inclusive Communities notes that HUD, the agency with authority
for administering and enforcing FHA claims, recently passed a
relevant regulation; Inclusive Communities urges the Court to
apply Chevron deference to the regulation. The regulation, passed
after notice and comment rulemaking, states that the FHA should
be interpreted to include disparate impact claims. It follows a long
history of HUD’s recognizing disparate impact theory in formal
adjudications as well as in various guidance and interpretive
documents. The Department argues that granting deference to
HUD on this issue would contribute to a dangerous precedent of
agencies that overreach in their enforcement of antidiscrimination
laws. The Department also points out that even if the FHA did allow
for disparate impact liability (which, of course, the Department
does not concede), nothing in the text permits HUD to unilaterally
determine exceptions to this liability.
Constitutional Issues
The Department identifies a potential constitutional problem that
could arise from applying disparate impact theory in this context,
arguing that exposing entities to disparate impact liability for
otherwise neutral decisions will compel them into race-conscious
decision making. This is unacceptable under modern Equal
Protection jurisprudence, which requires color-blind government.
The Department cites as support recent cases about race-conscious
decision making by municipalities, such as Parents Involved v.
Seattle School District, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (invalidating raceconscious school assignment plans), and Ricci v. DeStefano, 557
U.S. 557 (2009) (preventing a city from disregarding the results
of firefighter employment exams which had a disparate impact on
minorities). The Department concludes that, taken to its logical
extreme, disparate impact theory could actually impede government
programs that are specifically designed to assist minority
communities.
Inclusive Communities distinguishes this situation from the ones at
issue in Parents Involved and Ricci. It argues that the government
may constitutionally consider race as part of a voluntary compliance
effort to avoid perpetuating racial segregation. Moreover, in order
to ensure that the federal government stopped perpetuating racial
segregation, Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) and (e), which
require that HUD programs be administered in a manner that
affirmatively furthers the goals of fair housing. Local governments
voluntarily assume these obligations when they participate in these
programs, including the LIHTC program.

SIGNIFICANCE
The question of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable
is of great significance to fair housing law. For decades there has
been a strong consensus among lower courts that FHA cases can be
brought pursuant to disparate impact theory. Indeed, whole areas of
fair housing case law—such as challenges to exclusionary zoning
laws, overly strict occupancy standards, apartment complex policies
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

that burden members of protected groups, and mortgage lending
practices—have been developed based on this assumption.
Advocates have long regarded disparate impact theory as an
important enforcement tool, because contemporary discrimination
is likely to take a subtle form. Those who wish to discriminate are
usually savvy enough to mask it through the use of policies that are
neutral on their face but discriminatory in their effect. Disparate
impact theory provides an evidentiary mechanism to “smoke out”
such discrimination. In other situations, institutional actors may be
unaware of or indifferent to the discriminatory impact of policies
that they choose. This all occurs against a backdrop of long-standing
patterns of segregation and housing inequality—which are
themselves the products of decades of overtly discriminatory local,
state, and federal housing policy. Unless policymakers are required
to consider the effects of their actions, it will be all too easy for them
to unwittingly perpetuate or exacerbate these patterns.
Because disparate impact claims focus on policies and practices
that affect groups of people rather than just individuals, such cases
also have the potential for much farther-reaching effect. Similarly,
disparate impact claims are particularly likely to be brought against
“big defendants” such as municipal governments and financial
institutions (which explains the presence of a number of insurance
companies, banks, and financial services providers as amici for the
Department). Practices such as loan or insurance underwriting and
zoning inevitably produce disparate impacts on different groups.
Even if a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason constitutes a valid
defense, the availability of the disparate impact cause of action
creates a high-level exposure for municipalities and financial
institutions that are simply carrying out basic aspects of their jobs.
As the discussion of Title VII and the ADEA indicates, this case is
also one in a recent line of cases in which the Supreme Court is
asked to examine whether theories and analyses that have been
developed with respect to one civil rights statute—typically Title
VII—are applicable to others, where the wording is similar but not
identical. Cases in this line include Smith (evaluating disparate
impact theory under the ADEA), Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (requiring a different standard for
causation under the ADEA than under Title VII), and Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (rejecting disparate impact theory
under Title VI). Just as Smith looms large in the parties’ arguments
here, any ruling in this case may well affect how other civil rights
statutes are interpreted in future cases.
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housing and antidiscrimination law. Prior to entering academia, she
worked as a trial attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice Civil
Rights Division in the Housing and Civil Enforcement Section. She
can be reached at oliverir@missouri.edu or 573.882.5068.
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